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Playing Ostrich with the FAA's History:
The Scope of Mandatory Arbitration of
Employment Contracts
by
CLAIRE KENNEDY-WILKINS*

Introduction
During the past decade, the use of arbitration in individual

employment contracts has risen dramatically.' Due to concerns that
arbitration does not provide employees with the same protections
that they are afforded in court, the increased use of mandatory
arbitration clauses in employment contracts has become a cause of
concern for many.2 Recently, a great deal of the controversy has
centered on the issue of whether federal law even recognizes
mandatory arbitration of employment contracts.3

In 1925, Congress passed the Federal Arbitration Act (the
"FAA"). The FAA was a major piece of legislation recognizing
arbitration agreements as "valid, irrevocable, and enforceable."
Section 1 of the FAA states that "nothing herein contained shall
apply to contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or
any class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce.,6
* J.D., University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 2003. I would like to
thank Professor Reuel E. Schiller for his assistance.
1. Alexander J.S. Colvin, The Relationship Between Employment Arbitration and
Workplace Dispute Resolution Procedures, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DiSP. RESOL. 643, 643

(2001).
2. See, e.g., Julian J. Moore, Arbitral Review (or Lack Thereof): Examining the
ProceduralFairnessof Arbitrating Statutory Claims, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1572 (2000).
3. See Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001). At least as a practical
legal matter, this dispute was settled by the Court's decision in Circuit City.
4. United States Arbitration Act, 43 Stat. 883 (1925) (codified as amended at 9
U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2000)). As originally codified, the Act was called the United States
Arbitration Act. Today the Act. is uniformly referred to as the Federal Arbitration Act.
This Note will only refer to the Act as the FAA.
5. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000).
6. Id. § 1.
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The precise scope of the Section 1 exemption has been the subject of
a great deal of debate, most notably in the recent Supreme Court
decision in Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams.7
The modern interpretation of the Section 1 exception is so
narrow that it covers only seamen, railroad, and other transportation
employees.' From the Court's decision in Circuit City, it is clear that
the narrow reading of the exception has won out in the courts.
Despite this decision, sufficient recognition has not been given to the
meaning of the Section 1 exemption-as it was intended at the time it
was enacted. Neither has the Supreme Court provided an alternative
explanation for a narrow reading of section 1 if such a construction is
inconsistent with the original meaning of the exemption.
Indeed, the Court in Circuit City based its decision on a textual
analysis of Section 1 and found it unnecessary to consider the history
behind the exemption. 9 In dicta, the Court engaged in a cursory
discussion of the legislative history in response to the plaintiff's
arguments for a broader reading of the exemption." However, the
Court did not engage in a detailed analysis of the legislative intent or
thoroughly consider the context of the law's enactment. Rather, the
Court stated that "[it would be unwieldy for Congress, for the Court,
and for litigants to be required to deconstruct statutory commerce
clause phrases depending on the year of a particular statutory
enactment., 12 This position is inconsistent with the stance that the
Court has taken in other circumstances, where the Court has at times
gone to great lengths to deconstruct statutory language to give effect
to the text's original meaning, and has not found the task overly
taxing. 3
Given the Court's expertise in such matters, it hardly seems that
a thorough examination of the FAA's original meaning would prove
7. 532 U.S. at 105.
8. Id. at 109 (holding that the exception in Section 1 only applies to "contracts of
employment of transportation workers").
9. Id. at 119.
10. Id. at 119-20.
11. Id. at 119-21.
12. Id. at 118.
13. See Dir., Office of Workers' Comp. Programs, Dep't of Labor v. Greenwich
Collieries, 512 U.S. 267, 272-76 (1994). In Greenwich Collieries, the Court devoted five
pages of its opinion to defining the term "burden of proof" in the year the Administrative
Procedure Act was enacted. Id. at 271-76. As the Court explained, since the term was not
defined in the text of the statute, their "task is to construe it in accord with its-ordinary
or natural meaning." Id. at 272. However, the Court recognized that "the meaning of
words may change over time, and many words have several meanings even at a fixed point
in time" and thus found it necessary to ascertain the "ordinary meaning" of the term in the
year of the statute's enactment. Id. The Court went to great lengths to carry out this task,
consulting a substantial body of contemporary case law, as well as numerous treatises. Id.
at 272-76.
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so "unwieldy" as to prevent the Court from engaging in this analysis.
Furthermore, the current widespread use of mandatory arbitration
clauses in individual employment contracts, and its effect on the
American workforce, makes it important to examine carefully the
originally intended scope of the Section 1 exemption. A thorough
examination of the exemption's originally intended scope is important
for the added purpose of setting the record straight as a historical
matter. This Note argues that, as it was conceived of in 1925, the
exemption in Section 1 of the FAA excluded all employment
contracts from the scope of mandatory arbitration.
Part I of this Note lays out the historical context in which the
FAA emerged. This includes a discussion of the emergence of
arbitration in the United States and the history of the Act's drafting
and enactment. Part II engages in an analysis of the Act's scope, as it
was originally intended. This includes a textual analysis exploring the
meaning of the term "engaged in commerce" in 1925, as well as the
significance of this meaning. This section also examines the intended
scope of the Act through a look at its legislative history. Finally, Part
II examines how the public perceived the Act at the time it was
enacted. Part III proposes a solution to the conflict between the
Act's original intent and its modern interpretation.
I. Background of the Federal Arbitration Act's Enactment
A. The Emergence of Arbitration in the United States
At common law, arbitration agreements were not specifically
enforceable.' As a result, such agreements were often disregarded by
the parties to them, and arbitration had a limited effectiveness as a
method of dispute resolution. 5 While England passed a law in 1854
that made arbitration agreements enforceable, no such legislation was
passed in the United States until the 1920s. 6 In the United States,
New York led the movement to reform arbitration law by enacting a
statute in 1920 that Provided for the specific enforcement of
arbitration agreements.
Even before arbitration gained accentance by American courts,
merchants used arbitration as a swift and affordable means of
resolving business disputes.'8 Indeed, while arbitration is now
14. Wharton Poor, Arbitration Under the Federal Statute, 36 YALE L.J. 667, 667 (1927).
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Roger S. Haydock & Jennifer D. Henderson, Arbitrationand JudicialCivil Justice:
An American Historical Review and a Proposalfor a Private/Arbitraland Public/Judicial
Partnership,2 PEPP. DisP. RESOL. L.J. 141, 144-45 (2002).
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commonly associated with labor disputes, commercial arbitration was
the first form of arbitration used in the United States."9 Accordingly,
the arbitration reform movement was led by business and trade
associations seeking to improve the effectiveness of the dispute
resolution mechanism by making agreements to arbitrate enforceable
in court.2"' It was not until well after the FAA's enactment that
arbitration actually began to be used as a means of resolving labor
disputes.
B. The Drafting and Enactment of the Section 1 Exemption

In 1921, just after New York enacted its arbitration act, the
American Bar Association (the "ABA") passed a resolution directing
its Committee on Commerce, Trade and Commercial Law to
"consider ... the further extension of the principle of commercial

arbitration. '' 21 The following year, the Committee reported its
conclusion that "the administration of justice can be advanced first by
having Federal Statutes and Uniform State Statutes on the subject of
arbitration enacted. 2 2 More specifically, the Committee announced
that it held a public meeting and "perfected a state act upon
arbitration, and recommended that it be adopted by this
Association., 23 The Committee had actually drafted two acts-the
Uniform State Act on Arbitration and a federal act referred to as the
Arbitration of Disputes in Admiralty and Interstate and Foreign
Commerce. 4 Both acts were very similar to the recently enacted New
York law and neither contained an exception for employment
contracts.25
The following year, the Committee on Commerce, Trade and
Commercial Law submitted revised drafts of the two acts, as well as a
proposed treaty on the subject of international arbitration
agreements. During the Association's discussion of the Committee's
recommendations, one member inquired about "what subjects [were]
embraced in the matter of arbitration, as proposed by Mr. Piatt's
committee., 27 William Piatt, who had just taken over as Chairman of

19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

Id.
Id. at 147.
45 A.B.A. REP. 75 (1920).
46 A.B.A. REP. 53 (1921).
Id.
Id. at 355-61.

25. IAN R. MACNEIL, AMERICAN ARBITRATION LAW 85

26. 47 A.B.A. REP. 289 (1922).
27. Id. at 53.

(1992).
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the Committee," responded that "[c]ommercial arbitration was the
subject that the Committee... first took under consideration...
three years ago."2 At this meeting, the acts were renamed the
Uniform Act for Commercial Arbitration and the United States
Arbitration Act, the name that would stick with the Act through its
enactment. °
Again, neither act contained an exemption for
employment contracts.'
Furthermore, the Committee's report
contained no mention of industrial or labor arbitration, though it did
contain numerous references to commercial arbitration. 32
The version the FAA approved at the ABA's 1922 meeting was
introduced in Congress on December 20, 1922, by Senator Sterling
and Congressman Mills.33 Once it had been introduced, the bill was
referred to the Committee on the Judiciary in each branch. It was at
the hearing before the Subcommittee of the Committee on the
Judiciary for the Senate that the Section 1 exemption was first
considered. 34
Piatt, the chairman of the ABA's Committee on Commerce,
Trade and Commercial Law, testified at the Senate hearing. 5 In his
testimony, Piatt raised the issue of arbitration of employment
contracts:
[Tihere is another matter I should call to your attention. Since you
introduced this bill there has been an objection raised against it that
I think should be met here, to wit, the official head, or whatever he
is, of that part of the labor union that has to do with the ocean-the
seamen .... He has objected to it, and criticized it on the ground
that the bill in its present form would affect, in fact compel,
arbitration of the matters of agreement between stevedores and
their employers.... [I]t was not the intention of the bill to have
any such effect as that. It was not the intention of this bill to make
an industrial arbitrationin any sense; and so I suggest that in as far
as the committee is concerned, if your honorable committee should
feel that there is any danger of that, they should add to the bill the
following language, "but nothing herein contained shall apply to
seamen or any class of workers in interstate and foreign
commerce."
28. See Sales and Contracts to Sell Interstate and Foreign Commerce, and Federal
Commercial Arbitration: Hearing on S.4213 and S.4214 Before a Subcomm. of the Comm.
on the Judiciary, 67th Cong. 7 (1923) [hereinafter Sales and Contracts].
29. 47 A.B.A. REP. 53.
30. See id. at 315-21.
31. See id.
32. See id. at 52-53.
33. 48 A.B.A. REP. 286 (1923).
34. See Sales and Contracts,supra note 28, at 9.
35. See id.
36. Sales and Contracts, supra note 28, at 9 (statement of William Piatt, Chairman,
ABA Committee on Commerce, Trade and Commercial Law) (emphasis added).
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Piatt went on to testify that "[i]t is not intended that this shall be
an act referring to labor disputes, at all."37 As to the real purpose of

the FAA, "[i]t is purely an act to give the merchants the right or the
privilege of sitting down and agreeing with each other as to what their
damages are, if they want to do it. Now, that's all there is in this."3
Although the bill never made it out of the committee that year, the
language proposed by Piatt in the Senate hearing was the basis for the
amendment to Section 1 that remained in all subsequent versions of
the bill, including the one enacted into law in 1925."
When the ABA met in 1923, the Committee on Commerce,
Trade and Commercial Law reported that, "[o]wing to the lateness of
the session and the pressure of other important business, the bill was
not reported by the committees" during the last session. ' The
Committee went on to explain that they had drafted a new version of
the Act, incorporating the changes to Section 1." The amendment
read, "but nothing herein contained shall apply to contracts of
employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of
workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce."4 This is the
exact wording of Section 1, as it appears in the FAA today. 3
Once the Section 1 exception had been added, the Act was
introduced to Congress again, and this time a joint hearing was held
by the Subcommittees on the Judiciary for the House and Senate."
Other than to state that there was widespread support for the bill and
to note a complete lack of opposition to it, little was said in this
hearing that is relevant to Section L" The amendment to the Section
was not explicitly discussed at any time.
The House issued a report on January 24, 1924, expressing
approval for the bill and specifically mentioning the lack of
opposition in the joint committee hearing.47 On February 5, 1924,
Representative Graham placed the bill on the Consent Calendar. 8
Although a vote on the bill was postponed until it came up through
37. Id.
38. Id. The language proposed by Piatt at the Senate hearing was very similar, though
not identical, to the language used to amend the Act.
39. See 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2000).
40. 48 A.B.A. REP. 287 (1923).
41. Id.
42. 48 A.B.A. REP. app. B at 302.
43. 9 U.S.C. § 1
44. Arbitration of Interstate Commercial Disputes: Joint Hearing on S. 1005 and H.R.

646 Before the Subcomm. of the Comm. on the Judiciary,68th Cong. 1 (1924) [hereinafter
Arbitration].
45. Id.

46. See id.
47. H.R. REP. NO. 96, at 2 (1924).
48. 65 CONG. REC. H646, 1931 (1924) (statement of Rep. Graham).
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the course of the regular calendar, there was a brief discussion of the
purpose and effect of the bill.4 9 Graham explained that "[t]his bill
simply provides for one thing, and that is to give an opportunity to
enforce an agreement in commercial contracts and admiralty
contracts."50 When the bill came to the floor on the Consent
Calendar again on June 6, 1924, Representative Mills explained that
"[t]his bill provides that where there are commercial contracts and
there is disagreement under the contract, the court can [en]force an
arbitration agreement in the same way as other portions of the
contract.""
The bill did not appear before the Senate until December 30,
19242 There, Senator Walsh described the bill as providing "for the
abolition of the rule that agreements for arbitration will not be
specifically enforced. 5 3 He went on to explain that the old rule
needed to be abolished because the nation's business interests were
frustrated with the delay associated with litigation."
Ultimately, the bill was passed by both the House and the
Senate, and President Coolidge signed the FAA into law on February
12, 1925."5
II. The Originally Intended Scope of Section 1
A. Textual Analysis
Given the Court's preference for construing statutes according to
the plain meaning of their text, an analysis of the language of the
Section 1 exemption provides an appropriate starting place for
determining the original meaning of the provision. The mention in
Section 1 of "any other class of worker engaged in foreign or
interstate commerce" invites an inquiry into the meaning of this
language at the time it was included in the Act. Examining where the
development of the Commerce Clause doctrine was during the 1920s
allows for an accurate construction of the statute's text and provides
further evidence of the meaning that the drafters and enactors gave to
the Section 1 exemption.
In Circuit City, the Supreme Court characterized the phrase
"engaged in commerce" as a term of art expressing congressional
intent to limit regulation to something less than their full authority
49. Id.

50. Id.
51. Id. at 11080 (statement of Rep. Mills).
52. 66 CONG. REC. S1005,984 (1924) (statement of Sen. Walsh).
53. Id.

54. Id.
55. Federal Arbitration Act. ch.. 213. 43 Stat. 883-86 (1925).
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under the Commerce Clause. 6 However, this characterization only
reveals the modern conception of "engaged in commerce" as a term
of art. 7 As the Court admits in Circuit City, the question of what the
phrase meant in 1925 is left unanswered."' If, at the time it was
included in the Section 1 exemption, "engaged in commerce"
represented the full extent of Congress's Commerce Clause power,
this would further support the argument that the Act was originally
intended to exclude employment contracts to the full extent possible.
At the start, it is important to recognize that the United States
government is one of enumerated powers and that Congress can act
only when it can point to specific authorization in the text of the
Constitution. 9 In acting pursuant to its enumerated powers, Congress
is further limited by what the Court has determined the breadth of
such powers to be.0' The early presumption was that Congress's
authority under the Commerce Clause was quite limited.61
In order to determine precisely what "engaged in commerce"
connoted in 1925, it is helpful to review the Act's contemporary case
law. Two Supreme Court cases from the early 1900s involving the
Federal Employers Liability Act (the "FELA") demonstrate that
when the FAA was enacted, the phrase "engaged in commerce"
expressed what was then thought to be the outer limits of Congress's
power under the commerce clause.6"
In the Employers' Liability Cases, the Court found the FELA
unconstitutional on the grounds that it exceeded Congress's power to
regulate under the commerce clause.63

As originally enacted, the

FELA covered "all common carriers engaged in interstate commerce,
and impos[ed] ... liability upon them in favor of any of their

employe's, without qualification or restriction as to the business in
which the carriers or their employe's may be engaged at the time of
the injury. ' ' In other words, the FELA regulated individuals and
corporations "because they engage[d] in interstate commerce," as
opposed to just regulating "the business of interstate commerce"

56. Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 115-16.
57. See Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848, 855 (2000); Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v.
Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 277 (1995); United States v. Am. Bldg. Maint. Indus., 422 U.S. 271,
279-80 (1975). The only cases cited by the Court in Circuit City come well after the
relevant period of inquiry.
58. Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 116.
59. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552 (1995).
60. Id. at 552-56.
61. Id. at 552-55.
62. Employers' Liab. Cases, 207 U.S. 463, 498 (1908); Second Employers' Liab. Cases,
223 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1912).
63. 207 U.S. at 498.
64. Id.
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itself.65 The Court held that because the law included employees who
may not have been actually engaged in commerce when they were
injured, the Act "of necessity includes subjects wholly outside of the
power of Congress to regulate commerce."
In explaining how the FELA regulated beyond interstate
commerce, the Court used the example of a railroad company that
shipped goods as part of interstate commerce.67 The Court explained
that, if the same company had a local branch that operated entirely
within one state or had a local repair shop or warehouse, those
activities would be beyond interstate commerce because they were
separate from the company's actual business of interstate commerce.68
The explicit description of those employment activities the Court
considered within the realm of interstate commerce and those they
considered outside of that realm is consistent with a broad reading of
the language that was used in the Section 1 exemption.
If, after the Employers' Liability Cases, there was any doubt as to

the scope of Congress's power to regulate commerce, the Second
Employers' Liability Cases removed it.

In the Second Employers'

Liability Cases, the Court upheld the FELA, as it had been
amended.69 In describing the permissible scope of congressional
authority, the Court said that "Congress, in the exertion of its power
over interstate commerce, may regulate the relations of common
carriers by railroads and their employe's, while both are engaged in
such commerce."7 Again, this gave anyone drafting a piece of federal
legislation covering employees a clear roadmap as to what Congress
could regulate.
As these cases demonstrate, at the time of the FAA's enactment,
Congress's power to regulate the terms and conditions of
employment was thought to be limited to circumstances where
employees were actually engaged in acts of commerce. Regulation of
transportation workers like seamen and railroad employees was a
prime example of what was thought to be an appropriate use of
Commerce Clause power. Given this context, it is entirely plausible
that, rather than expressing an intent to limit the exemption to
transportation workers, seamen and railroad employees were listed as
a means of clarifying that Congress was not attempting to exceed its
Commerce Clause powers as they had recently been defined by the
Court. Supporting this argument is the fact that the only direct
evidence regarding the specific intent of the exemption explicitly
65. Id. at 497.
66. Id. at 498.
67. Id.
68. Id.

69. 223 U.S. at 1.
70. Id. at 48-49 (emphasis added).
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states that the intent of the Act was always to exclude labor disputes
from its scope.7 At no time did the drafters or enactors of the Act
express any views to the contrary.
All told, the Employers' Liability Cases demonstrate that prior to
the FAA's enactment, the phrase "engaged in commerce" was used
to refer generally to Congress's full powers under the Commerce

Clause. Indeed, it was not until 1937 that the Supreme Court began
its radical departure from this view of Commerce Clause authority."
Given this, it is hardly surprising that the language of Section 1
conformed to current Supreme Court precedent and limited the
exemption to "workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce."
Although the Court in Circuit City expressed concern that

construing the phrase "engaged in commerce" in the context in which
it was used would contradict their earlier cases and "bring instability
to statutory construction," these concerns do not appear to be well
founded.73 First, although the Court does not always construe terms
according to their usage at a particular time, in some instances the
Court has gone to great lengths to do precisely this.74 In a case such as
the present, where the meaning of the term in question varies greatly
depending on the time it was used, it seems particularly appropriate
to construe the term in its historical context in order to gain an
accurate understanding of its meaning.
Moreover, construing
"engaged in commerce" in its original context for the purpose of
interpreting the FAA will not lead to instability in statutory
construction. Not only has the Court engaged in this type of
71. Sales and Contracts, supra note 28, at 9.
72. The exact year depends on whether one views the turning point to be NLRB v.
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937), or Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111
(1942). In Laughlin Steel, the Court abandoned the distinction between direct and indirect
effects on interstate commerce in upholding the National Labor Relations Act. 301 U.S.
at 36-38. However, some scholars believe that the real turning point came in Wickard,
where the Court extended Congress' powers under the Commerce Clause to include even
the most attenuated activities. 317 U.S. at 125. Indeed, in Wickard, the Court permitted
regulation of wheat grown and harvested by a farmer for his personal consumption under
the guise of Congress' powers under the Commerce Clause. Id. at 118.
73. 532 U.S. at 117.
74. Compare FTC v. Bunte Bros, Inc., 312 U.S. 349, 351 n.2 (1941), with Greenwich
Collieries, 512 U.S. 267, 272-76 (1994). In Greenwich Collieries, the Court devoted five
pages of its opinion to defining the term "burden of proof" in the year the Administrative
Procedure Act was enacted. See 512 U.S. at 272-76. As the Court explained, since the
term was not defined in the text of the statute, their "task is to construe it in accord with
its ordinary or natural meaning." Id. at 272. However, the Court recognized that "the
meaning of words may change over time, and many words have several meanings even at a
fixed point in time" and thus found it necessary to ascertain the "ordinary meaning" of the
term in the year of the statute's enactment. Id. The Court went to great lengths to carry
out this task, consulting a substantial body of contemporary case law, as well as numerous
treatises. See id. at 272-76.
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contextual statutory construction in the past, without creating
instability, but the task of construing a term in a particular statute
need only be done once. Once the Court determines the meaning of
"engaged in commerce" as it was used in 1925, the scope of the
Section 1 exemption will be a settled matter.
Construing Section l's reference to "engaged in commerce" in
the context in which the FAA was enacted gives a precise and
historically accurate meaning to the exemption's text. As the Court's
past performance demonstrates, this is a task that the Court is
qualified to undertake. Once this additional step is taken, the
Employers' Liability Cases make it clear that, as it was used in the
Section 1 exemption, "engaged in commerce" refers to the outer
limits of Congress's power under the Commerce Clause and supports
a broad reading of the scope of the exemption.
Despite the clear textual interpretation provided by the
Employers' Liability Cases, critics of the broad interpretation of
Section 1 argue that the provision must still be read narrowly due to
the specific reference to seamen and railroad employees in the
exemption. For example, in Circuit City, the Court argues that,
pursuant to the maxim of statutory construction, ejusdem generis, the
specific mention of the two categories of employees indicates that the
subsequent phrase, "any other class of workers engaged in interstate
commerce," refers to other classes of workers like the two explicitly
mentioned.75 Others argue that since the mention of seamen and
railroad employees is superfluous if "any other class of workers
engaged in interstate commerce" refers to Congress's full powers
under the Commerce Clause, the purpose of including the two
specific categories must have been to limit the scope of the
exemption. " However, these arguments are flawed due to their
failure to consider the context in which the Act emerged.
First, reliance on the maxim of statutory construction, ejusdem
generis, construes the statute in such a way that, by the second phrase,
Congress is assumed to have been referring only to other types of
workers engaged in transportation.
However, this ignores the
Commerce Clause background upon which the Act was constructed.
Since the Court had recently made it clear that Congress could only
regulate those employees actually engaged in interstate commerce,
the first clause seems to indicate Congress's attempt to regulate
employees who were indisputably within those limits. On the other
hand, the second clause of the exemption seems instead to be an
75. 532 U.S. at 114-15.
76. William F. Kolakowski III, The Federal Arbitration Act and Individual
Employment Contracts: A Better Means to an Equally Just End, 93 MICH. L. REV. 2171,
2180-81 (1995).
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attempt to include every other type of employee who was engaged in
interstate commerce-and thus subject to congressional regulation
under the Act.
Next, reliance on another maxim of statutory construction, that
laws should be read to avoid being superfluous, should not be taken
as conclusive either. If there is an obvious explanation of why the
legislature included a superfluous provision, the intent of the
legislature controls over other general principles of statutory
construction. As the history of the exemption reveals, the concerns
raised by particular groups of transportation workers provided
Congress with ample motivation to mention certain classes of workers
specifically.77
Considering the fact that, at the time the FAA was enacted,
congressional authority to regulate commerce was defined by whether
a party was actually engaged in commerce, it is to be expected that
the Section 1 exception was framed in terms of those "engaged in
foreign or interstate commerce." Moreover, considering the history
of the exemption's enactment, it is not surprising that specific
mention was made of railroad and seamen. Instead, when the Act is
placed in its original context, a broad reading of the text of the
exemption is the only one that makes sense.
B.

Legislative History

In addition to the textual arguments in support of a broad
reading of the Section 1 exemption, the legislative history of the FAA
provides further support for such a construction. Although the Bill
was not discussed extensively on the floor of Congress, the ABA
Reports, when taken together with the debate that did take place in
Congress, provide a clear picture of the intended purpose of the
Act-to provide for enforceable arbitration clauses in commercial
contracts. Contrary to its modern interpretation, Section 1 was
intended to be construed broadly to exempt employment contracts
from the scope of mandatory arbitration.
(1) The Purpose of the FAA

It was apparent from the start that the ABA was concerned with
drafting a piece of commercial legislation to help merchants deal with
their disputes in a timely and effective manner. This remained the
focus of the Act throughout its numerous drafts."

This is first

apparent from the fact that the ABA referred the matter to its
77. See Sales and Contracts, supra note 28, at 9 (statement of William Piatt, Chairman,
ABA Committee on Commerce, Trade and Commercial Law).
78. Indeed, the FAA was interpretea this way until 1956. See Lincoln Mills of Ala. v.
Textile Workers Union, 230 F.2d 81, 86 (5th Cir. 1956).
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Committee on Commerce, Trade and Commercial Law, not to a
committee on labor issues."
Moreover, in the initial resolution referring the matter to a
committee, the issue was framed as "the further extension of the
principle of commercial arbitration."' '0 There is not a single mention
of the arbitration of industrial, labor, or employment disputes in the
ABA Reports from 1920 to 1923.81 Nor was there such a mention in
the Congressional hearings and debate on the various versions of the
FAA, except to say explicitly that "[i]t was not the intention of this
bill to make an industrial arbitration in any sense., 82 That this
statement was made by the Chairman of the ABA's Committee on
Commerce, Trade and Commercial Law to the Senate Committee on
the Judiciary shows that both the ABA and Congress based their
support of the FAA on the same information.
Indeed, when the Section 1 exemption was proposed before the
Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Piatt made it extremely clear that
the purpose of adding the amendment was to clarify that the intent of
the FAA was to make arbitration an effective tool for resolving
commercial disputes." If the Senators objected to limiting the FAA
in this manner, surely they would not have included the exemption in
the final version of the act, particularly without stating that the
exemption was intended to apply only to employees actually engaged
in transportation.
When the bill came up for vote before the Senate, it was not
described as applying specifically to commercial and admiralty
contracts, as it had been in the House.84 However, Senator Walsh did
explain that the reason the bill was needed was to meet the nation's
business interests.85 Again, there was no mention of its application to
labor, employment, or industrial disputes.86
While the debate on the Senate floor is less explicit about the
FAA was covering only commercial arbitration, it is significant that
the most explicit discussion of the exclusion of industrial arbitration
took place before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary. It was here
that Piatt testified that "[i]t is not intended that this shall be an act
referring to labor disputes at all., 87 Rather, he explained, it was

79.
80.
81.
A.B.A.

See 45 A.B.A. REP. 75 (1920).
Id. (emphasis added).
See generally id.; 46 A.B.A. REP. 52-54 (1921); 47 A.B.A. REP. 52-53 (1922); 48
REP. 52-60 (1923).

82. Sales and Contracts,supra note 28, at 9 (emphasis added).
83. See id.
84. Compare 65 CONG. REC. 11,080 (1924) with 66 CONG. REC. 984 (1924).

85. 66 CONG. REC. 984 (1924).
86. Id.
87. Sales and Contracts,supra note 28, at 9.
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intended to give merchants the ability to use enforceable arbitration
clauses in their business dealings.' No opposition to this idea was
expressed either in the Committee or before the Senate as a whole.89
Despite the fact that there was limited discussion of the FAA on
the floor of Congress, the ABA Reports, congressional hearing
reports, and the Congressional Record contain sufficient information
to indicate that both the drafters and the enactors of the FAA
thought that they were passing a law about arbitration of commercial
disputes. If Congress or the ABA actually did intend to include
employment contracts within the scope of the FAA, surely someone,
at some time during the four years the FAA was being drafted, would
have mentioned that the FAA was not limited only to commercial
arbitration, as was emphasized time and time again.
(2) The Motivationfor the Section 1 Exemption

Beyond the evidence that the FAA was not intended to govern
arbitration of employment contracts, the legislative history of the
FAA provides a clear explanation for the addition of the Section 1
exemption. As stated earlier, the Section 1 exemption was added to
the FAA as a direct result of Piatt voicing the concerns expressed by
the Seamen's Union." As Piatt explained, the head of the Seamen's
Union was concerned that the Act would "compel[] arbitration...
between the stevedores and their employers." 9' In light of the fact
that Piatt brought it to the attention of the Judiciary Committee that
the head of the Seamen's Union was concerned that the Act would
"compel[] arbitration.., between the stevedores and their
employers," it was quite logical for Congress to mention specifically
the employees represented by the union in the exemption in an effort
to placate the union.2 To strengthen the inference that seamen and
railroad employees were mentioned in direct response to the
concerns of the seamen's union, one needs only to look as far as the
union's annual convention. The president of the International
Seamen's Union discussed the FAA at their 1923 convention, stating
that:
This bill provides for the reintroduction of forced or involuntary
labor, if the freeman through his necessities shall be induced to

sign. Will such contracts be signed? Esau agreed, because he was
hungry. It was the desire to live that caused slavery to begin and

continue. With the growing hunger in modern society, there will be
88. Id.
89. Id.; 66 CONG. REC. 984 (1924).

90. Sales and Contracts, supra note 28, at 9.
91. Id.
92. Id.; see 9 U.S.C.A. § 1 (1999) ("[N]othing herein contained shall apply to contracts
of employment of seamen....").
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but few that will be able to resist.

The personal hunger of the

seaman, and the hunger of the wife and children of the railroad
man will surely tempt them to sign, and so with sundry other
workers in "Interstateand Foreign Commerce.,9'

As this shows, the language used in the Section 1 exemption is
almost a direct quote from the leader of the Seamen's Union.
Given the direct correlation between the language in the union
president's speech and the language adopted in the FAA, there is
little doubt that the union's concerns motivated the wording of the
exemption. Moreover, since there had been virtually unanimous
support for the bill up until the International Seamen's Union
expressed its concerns, there was motivation for the proponents of
the FAA to add the exemption, as Piatt suggested, to preserve the
lack of controversy regarding the bill.

As the history of the FAA illustrates, the Section 1 exemption
was added in direct response to the concerns of the Seamen's Union
and was not intended to apply to arbitration of industrial or labor
contracts. To ignore the significant history behind the exemption
when interpreting the statute is to give false meaning to its intent.
C.

Section 1 in the Public Eye

To understand the original meaning of the Section 1 exemption
further, it is helpful to consider how the exemption was perceived by
legal scholars at the time. A survey of law review articles published in
the wake of the FAA's enactment corroborates much of what was
found in the ABA Reports and Congressional Record, namely that
the FAA was not intended to include arbitration of employment
contracts.
The unwavering sentiment of legal scholars at the time the FAA
was passed was that the FAA provided for enforceable commercial
arbitration as a response to the business community's dissatisfaction
with the existing arbitration law. Indeed, the American Bar
Association Journal reported that "[n]o piece of commercial
legislation ...has been passed by Congress in a quarter of a century

comparable in value to this."'
One 1926 article on the recently passed law did state that "[t]he
scope of the Federal act and its potential usefulness are too little
known." 95 While this could be used to argue that the FAA's scope
was not seen as obviously limited to commercial arbitration, the

93. Proceedings of the 26th Annual Convention of the InternationalSeamen's Union of
America 203-04 (1923) [hereinafter Int'l Seamen's Union] (emphasis added).
94. The United States Arbitration Law and Its Application, 11 A.B.A. J. 153, 153
(1925).
95. Julius Henry Cohen & Kenneth Dayton, The New FederalArbitrationLaw, 12 VA.
L. REV. 265, 266 (1926).
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article went on to say that the scope of the FAA "must be read in the
light of the situation which it was devised to correct and of the history
of arbitration and of similar statutes in the recent past."" As stated
elsewhere in the same article, arbitration was historically used to
settle business disputes, although agreements to arbitrate were not
legally binding. 7 The authors went on to state that the new federal
law was "the direct outcome of this experience of American business
and of the necessity for some remedy which will cut the Gordian knot
of the law's delay."9 This only reinforces the notion that the FAA
was about addressing the business community's need to resolve their
commercial disputes in a timely manner.
Another journal described the FAA as "the outgrowth of a
movement of growing momentum."'
Specifically, "[b]usiness men
generally had come to dislike and distrust the expense and result of
litigation arising out of business disputes. '' ° In discussing whether
there was support for the FAA, the article mentioned only that it
"had the growing support of the business world, as well as the official
support of important legal organizations.""' If the perception was
that the FAA applied to arbitration of employment contracts, it
would seem logical for the author also to mention whether the FAA
had the support of labor organizations. Yet, as in the ABA Reports
and Congressional Record, no labor organizations were mentioned.' 2
Similarly, during the 1924 joint hearing before the
Subcommittees of the Committees on the Judiciary, the Chairman
read into the record all of the letters that were received about the
bill.'0 3 This included letters from the Secretary of Commerce and
numerous business groups and chambers of commerce." In addition,
Charles Bernheimer, a representative from the New York Chamber
of Commerce, submitted a list of organizations that had come out in
support of the FAA.' 5 Among all the organizations writing in about
the FAA, there was not one union or labor organization." Indeed,
the only mention in the ABA Reports and the Congressional Record
of a union comment on the FAA was that of the International
Seamen's Union.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Note, Effect of the United States ArbitrationAct, 25 GEO. L.J 443, 445-46 (1937).
100. Id.
101. Id. at 445-46.
102. Except, of course, the International Seamen's Union, whose concerns spawned the
exception.
103. Arbitration,supra note 44, at 19-24.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 21-22.
106. Id. at 19-24.
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Although the International Seamen's Union was the only union
mentioned in the official reports, there is evidence that other labor
organizations, such as the American Federation of Labor, opposed
the bill as it was originally drafted. 7 Like the International Seamen's
Union, the American Federation of Labor was concerned that the
FAA would be applied to labor disputes."8 After the FAA was
amended, the Executive Council of the American Federation of
Labor stated, "[P]rotests from the American Federation of Labor and
the International Seamen's Union brought an amendment... [that]
exempted labor from the provisions of the law, although its sponsors
denied there was any intention to include labor disputes. '1 9

This comment from the American Federation of Labor
demonstrates that, to the extent that labor organizations did comment
on the FAA, it was to express their disapproval of subjecting
employment contracts to mandatory arbitration. Since the comment
was made after the FAA was enacted, it also shows that the
American Federation of Labor understood Section 1 to exempt
employment contracts explicitly from the scope of the law.
III. Remedying the Modern
Misconception of Section 1
By settling on a narrow interpretation of the FAA's Section 1
exemption, this Note argues that the Supreme Court has ignored the
history of the FAA and the evolution of arbitration in the United
States. In doing so, the Court has settled on a reading of the
exemption that is inconsistent with its original meaning and the Court
has not provided an adequate justification for this departure. The
author recognizes that the Supreme Court is highly unlikely to
reverse its current reading of the Section 1 exemption to bring it in
line with the original intent of the FAA. In the absence of such a
reversal, it is up to Congress to remedy the conflict between the
FAA's original meaning and its current construction.
Congress should recognize that, when the FAA was enacted,
mandatory arbitration was seen simply as a way to provide for
commercial arbitration and address some of the problems facing the
nation's business community.
If Congress finds mandatory
arbitration of employment contracts to be a good policy today, which
is questionable given the lack of protection it offers employees,
Congress should amend the Act to exclude only those employees
engaged in transportation. If, on the other hand, Congress recognizes
107. Circuit City, 532 U.S. 105, 127-28 n.8 (2001) (citing Proceedings of the 45th Annual
Convention of the American Federation of Labor 52 (1925)).
108. See id.
109. Id.
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the wisdom that the International Seamen's Union had in 1923, it will
realize that not only does subjecting employment contracts to
mandatory arbitration violate the original intent of the FAA, but it
places workers at a significant disadvantage."I
Mandatory arbitration poses a number of serious problems for
employees. In addition to leaving employees with little control over
the decision of whether or not to submit to arbitration, forcing
workers into arbitration leaves them without the superior protections
of the courts."1 Due to this lack of judicial protection, "the potential
to exploit bargaining power or abuse the process is ripe."" 2 In
addition, in many instances arbitration provides employees with
inadequate remedies for their workplace disputes."3 The criticisms of
arbitration, particularly mandatory arbitration, are mounting, and
there is a growing consensus that it does not adequately protect the
interests of employees."4
As the president of the Seamen's Union was aware, workers do
not have the same leverage in negotiating contracts with their
employers as do merchants negotiating contracts among themselves.
This results in a situation where, as we have seen, employees are
increasingly left with little choice but to enter into contracts providing
for mandatory arbitration of ensuing disputes. For these reasons, the
author proposes that Congress amend the FAA to reflect its intended
purpose of excluding employment contracts from mandatory
arbitration.

110. See Int'l Seamen's Union, supra note 93 at 203-04.
111. Maureen A. Weston, Checks on Participant Conduct in Compulsory ADR:
Reconciling the Tension in the Need for Good-Faith Participation, Autonomy, and
Confidentiality, 76 IND. L.J. 591, 604 (2001). As Weston explains, "[b]ecause ADR lacks
the procedural protections of a judicial forum, such as rights to a jury trial, discovery,
appeal, and judicial remedies for abusive conduct, the possibilities for unfairness cannot be
overlooked." Id.
112. Id.
113. See Sarah Johnston, Alternative Dispute Resolution Symposium: Current Public
Law and Policy Issues in ADR: ADR in the Employment DiscriminationContext: Friend
or Foe to Claimants, 22 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL'Y 335, 374 (2001) (arguing that
arbitration provides inadequate remedies to employees who have been discriminated
against in violation of Title VII).
114. See Eric A. Hernandez, Note, Mandatory Arbitration and Employment
Discrimination: The Unfair Law, 2 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 96, 101 (2001),
available at http://www.cardozojcr.com/vol2nol/notes02.html.
The author notes that

"[tihe EEOC, members of Congress and the commissioner of the Securities and Exchange
Commission ("SEC") have all publicly criticized mandatory arbitration." Id. See also
Johnston, supranote 113; Weston, supra note 111.
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Conclusion
This Note has read the text of the Section 1 exemption in the
context in which it arose and considered the meaning that was given
to the text by the then-prevailing view of Congress's Commerce
Clause powers. Moreover, this Note has explored the history of the
Section 1 exemption by examining the record left by the drafters and
enactors of the FAA. This Note has also examined how legal scholars
and the general public viewed the FAA upon its passage. Each piece
of history indicates that, as it was originally conceived, Section 1
excluded employment contracts from mandatory arbitration to the
full extent allowed by the Commerce Clause. Together, this creates a
strong case for the broad interpretation of the exemption.
By "[p]laying ostrich" to the rich history behind the FAA's
Section 1 exemption, the Supreme Court has essentially rewritten the
FAA." ' Rather than giving the Section 1 exemption its logical
meaning, the Court has ignored explicit evidence that the FAA was
not intended to apply to employment contracts and has found instead
that the FAA embraces arbitration of such contracts. Due to the
ever-increasing presence of mandatory arbitration clauses in
employment contracts, the time has come for Congress to remedy the
situation by amending the FAA to clarify the law's exemption of
employment contracts.

115. Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 128 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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